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Abstract This article begins by tracing two issues to be kept in mind in discussing
the theme of love as far back as Aristotle: on the one hand the polysemy of the term
philia in Aristotle, and on the other hand the fact that there is a focal or core meaning
of philia that provides order to that polysemy. Secondly, it is briefly suggested that
the same issues are, mutatis mutandis, central for understanding the discussion of
love or Liebe by Hegel, the central classic reference in debates on recognition.
Thirdly, by pointing out a certain ambiguity in Harry Frankfurt’s recent work on
love, the article focuses more closely on the thought that love in the simple sense
which Aristotle had pinpointed as the focal meaning of philia, which is arguably at
the core of Hegel’s discussion of Liebe, and which still forms at least one of the core
senses of the term, is a ‘personifying’ attitude of recognition. Finally, drawing on the
above points the article addresses the question whether love as a form of recognition
is restricted to intimate relations such as those between family-members, ‘lovers’,
close friends and so on, or whether it has applications in interhuman relations more
broadly. The answer to this question, it is suggested, is essential for the viability of
ethically substantial notions of solidarity beyond circles of close acquaintances,
whether within the civil society, across nations, or towards future generations.
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Introduction
There are a great variety of phenomena called ‘love’, many ancient words translated
by this one word, and various, often incompatible philosophical definitions.
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Whichever of the more exact senses of the word one has in mind, conceiving it
properly requires accounting for a rich constellation of other closely related
phenomena—some of which may also go by the same name. The theory of
recognition introduces one particular way of thinking about love, namely as a form
of recognition—or more technically, as a species of the genus ‘recognitive attitude’.
In this article I will begin by tracing two issues to be kept in mind in
discussing the theme as far back as Aristotle. These are, on the one hand the
polysemy of the term philia in Aristotle, and on the other hand the fact that there
is a focal or core meaning of philia that provides order to the polysemy.
Secondly, I argue briefly that the same issues are, mutatis mutandis, central for
understanding the discussion of love or Liebe by Hegel, the central classic
reference in debates on recognition.
Thirdly, by showing that there is a certain ambiguity in Harry Frankfurt’s recent
work on love, I focus more closely on the thought that love in the simple sense
which Aristotle had pinpointed as the focal meaning of philia, which is arguably at
the core of Hegel’s discussion of Liebe, and which still forms at least one of the core
senses of the term, is a ‘personifying’ attitude of recognition. Love in the sense in
question is concern for someone’s happiness for his or her own sake.
Fourthly, drawing on the points made so far I focus on the question brought up
in recent work on recognition—namely whether love as a form of recognition is
restricted to intimate relations such as those between family-members, ‘lovers’,
close friends and so on, or whether it has applications in interhuman relations more
broadly. On the one hand, the idea of loving people whom one does not know
personally is faced with a conceptual problem pointed out by Daniel Brudney. On
the other hand, this idea seems necessary for ethically substantial notions of
solidarity beyond circles of close acquaintances, whether within the civil society,
across nations, or towards future generations.
The question whether it is possible to consistently conceive of love as a form of
recognition beyond close circles of acquaintances thus not only concerns the limits
of application of one of the major elements of recognition-theory, but also the real
world applicability of the concept of solidarity. I end by casting doubt on Brudney’s
way of trying to solve the impasse, and propose very briefly another solution that
warrants further investigation.
Complications with Philia
Aristotle’s efforts in reconstructing the meaning of the Greek term philia involve a
certain ambiguity or polysemy which it is useful to examine in order to see clearly
how similar ambiguities play out in contemporary ways of thinking and talking
about love. There are two different issues that Aristotle—following the everyday
word use of his day—calls philia. First, there are the famous three forms of philia:
pleasure-philia, utility-philia, and philia between good men qua good (Aristotle
2001a, Book VIII).1 Of these, Aristotle suggests that the third is philia ‘firstly
1 References to Aristotle are given by Bekker number.
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and in the proper sense’ and the two others only ‘by analogy’ (Aristotle 2001a,
1157a31).
But secondly, there is something that according to Aristotle is the ‘focal’
meaning of the word.2 This, as he writes in the Rhetoric, is ‘wishing for [someone]
what you believe to be good things, not for your own sake but for his’ (Aristotle
2001b, 1380b37; see also 2001a, 1166a3–1166a5). What is potentially confusing
here is that the first of the three phenomena called philia on the one hand, and philia
in what Aristotle thinks is the focal meaning on the other hand, are categorially
different kinds of things.
To clarify this, let us introduce a simple threefold distinction between
(1) concrete interpersonal relationships, involving both psychological and
other elements,
(2) complexes of interpersonal attitudes and other closely related psychological
phenomena such as emotions and sensations involved in (1), and
(3) single interpersonal attitudes etc. comprising (2).
Whereas pleasure-philia, utility-philia, and philia between the good are different
kinds of (1) concrete interpersonal relationships, what the focal meaning of philia
refers to is (3) a single interpersonal attitude. As any concrete interpersonal
relationships, the three kinds of philia-relationships involve different kinds of (2)
complexes of attitudes that the parties to a relationship have with regard to each
other.3 In any individual relationship, many of the attitudes (as well as emotions and
sensations related to these) are particular to that relationship. Yet, some of them are
characteristic or defining of the kind of relationship that it is. Aristotle’s
classification of the three types of philia-relationships mentioned is based on
focusing in each case on one interpersonal attitude that provides the primary reason
for engaging and staying in a relationship, and in this way defines it as of the kind it
is.
Or not quite. What I have just said is true of pleasure-philia where the defining
attitude is that of valuing (or perhaps one should say desiring) the other because of
her qualities that the subject finds pleasurable, as well as in the case of utility-philia
where the defining attitude is that of valuing the other because of her qualities that
the subject finds useful (Aristotle 2001a, 1156a6–1156b6). Yet, the situation is more
complicated with regard to the philia-relationship between the good. In several
passages Aristotle distinguishes this from the two other philia-relationships by
saying that in philia between the good partners care about each other’s good or well-
being for the other’s own sake, whereas in utility- and pleasure-philia they only care
about it for the sake of gaining pleasure or utility for themselves (Aristotle 2001a,
2 See Vlastos (1973, pp. 4–5). ‘Focal meaning’ is Vlastos’s translation (owed to G. E. L. Owen) of
Aristotle’s phrase pros hen legomenon that Aristotle uses in defining philia (Aristotle 1984,
1236a16–1236b27). Aristotle does not use this phrase in talking about the philia-relationship between
the good.
3 What I want to signal with the word ‘concrete’ is that concrete relationships are not reducible to
psychological or ‘subjective’ factors, but always also involve various kinds of ‘objective’ factors or
elements, such as interconnected social and institutional roles and various kinds of physical factors.
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1156a6–1156a22).4 Hence there is good evidence to think that this attitude—caring
about the good, well-being or happiness5 of the other for her own sake (or as I shall
say in short, caring, or being concerned, about the other unconditionally6)—is what
defines the philia-relationship between the good. Yet, there is another attitude that
most interpreters tend to think is the defining element of these relationships.
Clearly, when partners in a relationship are good or virtuous, they not only
unconditionally care about each other’s well-being (this is what good people do
according to Aristotle7), but they also (at least tend to) value each other for their
virtuous qualities (Aristotle 2001a, 1156b15–1156b18.). Thus there is in fact a
complex of interrelated interpersonal attitudes comprising of mutual unconditional
concern for the other, and mutual cherishing of the goodness or virtuousness of the
other (part of which is his unconditional concern for one), that together form the
characteristic psychological profile of the philia-relationship between the good.8
There does not seem to be any obvious answer to the question whether caring about
the other unconditionally, or valuing the goodness of the other, is the primary reason
why good men engage in these kinds of philia-relationships, and in this regard they
are a more complex affair than relationships based on pleasure or utility on
Aristotle’s idealizing or ideal-typifying description.
Unfortunately Aristotle does not make an explicit theme of the distinction
between unconditional concern or care9 for the other on the one hand and valuing
the other for her virtuous (or other) qualities on the other hand, but leaves this to the
reader. A failure by the reader to adequately think through the elements of the
philia-relationship between the good in their difference and interrelations easily
leads to confusion, such as the view that Aristotle actually failed to have a clear
concept of caring about someone’s well-being or happiness ‘for her own sake’, i.e.
regardless of her qualities, at all, making it rationally dependent on the object of
love having virtuous qualities that the subject appreciates.10 This is clearly wrong
since where Aristotle actually discusses the focal meaning of philia—the attitude of
unconditional care for the other—he is perfectly explicit that this is rationally
4 See lines 1156a9–1156a10: ‘wish well to each other in that respect to which they love one another’);
1156b9: ‘wish well to their friends for their sake’; and 1168a32: ‘the good man acts […] for his friend’s
sake’.
5 I use these terms interchangeably. ‘Happiness’ is however here the key term since of the three only it
makes explicit that the objects in question are beings with perspectives, and moreover with perspectives
of possible happiness or misery—which is to say persons.
6 ‘Intrinsically’ is a term often used in this context and I have used it as well in previous work. It has
however unfortunate associations with the notion of ‘intrinsic value’ that I want to avoid here to
emphasize the difference between personifying care or concern on the one hand and valuing on the other.
7 See note 4.
8 Other accompanying psychological phenomena—attitudes, emotions and sensations—are of course
involved as well, but they will vary more from case to case.
9 I use these terms interchangeably in this paper.
10 According to Vlastos, Aristotle did not have even an ‘inkling’ of the notion of unconditional concern
for the other (Vlastos 1973, p. 33). This is a startling claim, considering that Vlastos is otherwise clear
enough on the focal meaning of philia in Aristotle, but it is understandable as a consequence of the
confusion to which I am drawing attention.
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unconditioned by the qualities of the beloved.11 His paradigmatic example is a
mother’s attitude towards her infant, where the infant does not at first even have
virtuous qualities (including the philia-attitude towards her parents) (Aristotle
2001a, 1159a28–1159a33; 1161b26–1161b28). Aristotle is also clear that this very
same attitude is present in philia-relationships between the virtuous (but not in the
two other kinds of philia-relationships he discusses). Although in such relationships
it belongs to a complex of interpersonal attitudes which also involves the attitude of
valuing the other for his goodness or virtuousness, it is not true that the parties in
such relationship only care about each other’s happiness because they value each
other’s goodness or virtuousness (or any other qualities for that matter). In fact, this
would be self-defeating since an element of what it is to be good in Aristotle’s view
is, as I have said, to care about others for their own sakes, i.e. regardless of their
qualities.
All in all, in Aristotle’s reconstruction there is a focal meaning of philia, namely
the attitude of caring about someone’s good, well-being or happiness uncondition-
ally or ‘for her own sake’, and this, in his view, is a necessary (but not the sole)
element of the attitude–complex characteristic of relationships that primarily
deserve the name philia. If Aristotle failed in something in his reconstruction of the
thematic complex that the many senses of philia referred to, then it was in not
clearly communicating all of the relevant distinctions to his readers.12
Caution with Liebe
For Hegel, the central classic reference in recognition-theory, it is as important in
reading his treatment of the theme of love or Liebe as it is in reading Aristotle’s
treatment of philia to be clear about the threefold distinction above.13 If it is
possible, Hegel is generally speaking even less explicit about it than Aristotle. This
is understandable given the central ideas that provide the context within which
Hegel discusses the theme of Liebe more or less throughout his intellectual career.14
Hegel’s view is, in the spirit of conceptual realism and normative essentialism, that
there are structures of reality that empirical phenomena instantiate as their essences,
and that these structures are normative criteria for the phenomena. In the realm of
‘spirit’—the human life-form that is—the structure most fundamental of all is that
of ‘finding oneself in one’s other’, which in brief means for Hegel a structure of
overcoming alienation and in this sense achieving ‘unity’, while at the same time
11 Rationally independent means that the qualities do not provide reasons to love or not to love. This does
not rule out that they could play some causal role in the coming about or fading of love.
12 One might of course complain also about Aristotle’s choice to accept the word-usage of his day in
using the term philia ‘by analogy’ even for relationships based on pleasure or utility, which—on his own
description—do not involve philia in the focal sense at all. Whereas the connection between philia on the
focal sense and the philia-relationship between the good that I have pointed out provides justification for
the practice of calling these by the same term, the nature of the ‘analogy’ remains thereby still unclarified.
13 Williams (2010) is useful in pointing out analogies between Aristotle’s treatment of philia and Hegel’s
treatment of Liebe, yet it suffers from lack of clarity exactly on this distinction.
14 The best monograph length treatment of Liebe in Hegel that I know of is Werner (2007).
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retaining difference. This, on Hegel’s account, is the overarching normative
principle of social life, the degree of whose instantiation in tokens of social life is
decisive for their ethical quality.15 Hegel conceived early on in Tu¨bingen of love or
Liebe as an instantiation of this structure,16 and later on in Jena and thereafter
recognition becomes the central concept in terms of which Hegel talks of its
instantiations. In the latter stage, however, love remains in the picture as one of the
forms of recognition.17
The main thing that interests Hegel in his discussions of Liebe is that it is, as he
sees it, an instantiation of the structure in question. He is usually not particularly
careful in specifying when he means by Liebe a concrete relationship, a complex of
attitudes (and other psychological phenomena), or a single attitude, since all of these
can be meaningfully thought of as instantiations of ‘finding oneself in one’s other’.
Other distinctive features of Hegel’s treatment of the theme of Liebe include his
explicit emphasis on sexuality, as well as his later focus on the bourgeois nuclear
family as the institutional setting of Liebe.
All in all, there is a rich constellation of issues at stake in Hegel’s discussion
of Liebe and—even more so than Aristotle with the constellation of issues he calls
philia—he leaves it for the reader to think through its internal structure. In order to
do so properly, it is essential to distinguish between
1. concrete interpersonal relationships, especially (but not only)18 those within
the bourgeois nuclear family between the spouses on the one hand and between
children and their parents on the other, involving not only attitudinal and other
psychological or ‘subjective’ elements, but also institutional, physical and other
‘objective’ elements,
2. the complexes of interpersonal attitudes and other psychological phenomena
involved in the different concrete relationships, and finally
3. single interpersonal attitudes, emotions etc. comprising the different com-
plexes. For example, sexual desire is one such attitude that belongs to some
complexes but not to others.
There is no space to argue this here, but I have elsewhere tried to show that there
is one attitude that is essential in how exactly the constellation of issues that Hegel
calls Liebe instantiates the structure of ‘finding oneself in one’s other’, an attitude
that thereby forms the core of all relationships and all attitude–complexes that
deserve the name Liebe in Hegel.19 This is the attitude of unconditional concern for
15 For more on Hegel’s normative essentialism and the basic principles of his Philosophy of Spirit, see
Ika¨heimo (2011).
16 See for example Hegel: ‘love […] finds itself in other people’ (1984, p. 46).
17 For the view that the notion of recognition has an important presence in Hegel’s work not only in but
also after Jena, see Williams (1997).
18 Here and there Hegel mentions friendship (Freundschaft) as an instantiation of ‘finding oneself in the
other’. See for example Hegel (1971, p. 176 [§436]).
19 See Ika¨heimo (2011) where I argue that one needs to have this concept of love in mind if one is to
make sense of how exactly love as a form of recognition can fulfil all the functions that it has in Hegel, or
in other words to see how exactly it instantiates the structure of ‘finding oneself in one’s other’.
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the good, well-being or happiness of the other—the very same attitude that is on
Aristotle’s view the focal meaning of philia.20
Love as Personification
I believe there is overwhelming evidence that what Aristotle over two millennia ago
thought of as the focal meaning of philia and what around two centuries ago was at
the core of Hegel’s treatment of Liebe is also today at least one of the core senses
of ‘love’ (and its equivalents in at least most European languages), if not the core
sense.21 It is also what Axel Honneth mostly understands by love as a form of
recognition in his seminal work on the theme—and in my view rightly so. There are
some passages in Honneth, however, where the phenomenon in question—caring
about someone’s happiness for her own sake—gets confused with valuing someone
for her qualities.22 Yet, confusion between the various attitudes comprising typical
or characteristic attitude–complexes in the relevant kinds of concrete relationships is
less characteristic of Honneth’s writing as it is of the work of some other authors of
interest for the themes of love and recognition.
Importantly, Harry Frankfurt’s in many ways insightful recent treatises on the
theme of love eventually suffer from a fundamental unclarity on the very concept at
stake. Discussing the specific kind of unclarity in Frankfurt helps us to thematize the
essentially interpersonal nature of love as a form of recognition. In Taking
Ourselves Seriously Frankfurt defines love as a ‘particular mode of caring’, namely
an ‘involuntary, nonutilitarian, rigidly focused […] self-affirming concern for the
existence and the good of what is loved’. That loving is non-utilitarian means for
Frankfurt that it is caring about the beloved ‘for its own sake’ (Frankfurt 2006,
p. 40). In loving the lover does not care about the ‘existence or good’ of the beloved
from the point of view of his or her own individual interests (of pleasure, utility,
20 What interests me here is more the internal logic of Hegel’s thinking about love, and less whether
every detail of what he wrote is actually consistent with this logic. Yet, one can test the thesis that this
attitude is the ‘core’ in the sense of a necessary element of everything that Hegel himself calls Liebe by
finding passages where he talks about Liebe in a systematic sense where this is not the case on a plausible
reconstruction. Things are somewhat complicated though by Hegel’s commitment to normative
essentialism which allows that phenomena can instantiate their essences to different degrees. This means
that in principle relationships or attitude-complexes can count as Liebe to different degrees, depending on
the relative significance of the attitude in question in them.
21 A common objection to defining love as caring about the good, well-being or happiness of someone for
her own sake is that this is an abstract and bloodless notion of love foreign to the real life complexity—
and according to the romantic objector, passion—of love. But here one should ask whether the objector
has in mind concrete relations, complexes of attitudes etc., or single attitudes. Concrete relationships can
be very complex indeed and the same is true of attitude-complexes. And often, but not always, these
involve passionate emotions and sensations. Yet, if one asks for one single criterion on which to decide
whether there is or was real or genuine love in a relationship, or whether a complex of attitudes etc.
between partners in a relationship really also includes or included love, then the attitude at stake is a very
strong candidate.
22 See Honneth on the ‘uniqueness’ of the loved one for the loving person that is a function of ‘the unique
way’ in which her ‘qualities come together’ (2007, p. 167). For sure, something like this is quite often
very important for the attitude-complexes involved in love-relationships. Yet, it is a different matter to
claim that it is essential to them. I abstract here from Honneth’s treatment of relations of love in Honneth
2011, pp. 252–276.
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etc.), but rather internalizes ‘the interests of the beloved as his own’, and thus
unconditionally, without conditioning by his own separate interests, ‘benefits when
his beloved flourishes’ and ‘suffers when it is harmed’ (Frankfurt 2006, p. 41).
All this sounds reminiscent of Aristotle’s focal meaning of philia, as well as of
Hegel’s idea of Liebe as finding oneself in the other; yet there is a decisive
difference between Frankfurt on the one hand and Aristotle and Hegel on the other.
Frankfurt thinks that the object of love can be ‘almost anything—a life, a quality of
experience, a person, a group, a moral idea, a nonmoral idea, a tradition, whatever’
(Frankfurt 2006, p. 40). This is something Aristotle would never have thought of
philia, nor Hegel of Liebe, both thinking of the phenomenon in question as an
essentially interpersonal one. I believe there is good reason for them to do so.
Arguably, Frankfurt’s basic failure is that he does not distinguish between the
attitude of unconditional concern or ‘care’ in an essentially interpersonal or
‘personifying’ sense on the one hand, and that of valuing in a not essentially
interpersonal sense on the other hand. The all important difference between these is
that the former is not a matter of valuing its object at all, but rather of valuing from
the perspective of the object—which obviously involves taking the object as a being
with a perspective.
Beings with perspectives are called subjects, and subjects with perspectives of
the relevant kind—in short, perspectives that make it possible for the subject to
experience happiness or misery—are persons. To care about x’s happiness or
subjective well-being unconditionally, which is to say to see the world in evaluative
terms from his perspective of possible happiness and misery, thus involves taking x
as a person. In contrast, to value x does not necessarily involve taking x as a person.
Frankfurt’s indistinction between these in his talk of ‘love’ obfuscates the obvious
fact that talking about the ‘interests’, ‘good’, or ‘sake’ of the beloved take on very
different meanings depending on whether one takes the beloved as a person with a
subjective perspective of possible happiness or misery, or whether one takes the
beloved as some other type of entity altogether, such as a quality or idea. It is also a
very different matter to suffer, on the one hand, when ones beloved suffers, because in
loving him or her one sees the world in evaluative terms (partly) from his or her
perspective and thus immediately subjectively benefits or suffers when (one thinks)
she does, and to suffer, on the other hand, when, say, an idea one values or endorses (or
‘really loves’, to speak loosely) is generally misunderstood and in this way ‘harmed’.
Frankfurt is of course free to ignore this distinction—one which on my reading is
already implicitly present in Aristotle and Hegel even if they never spelled it out
loud and clear—and the confusing consequences that doing so may have on his own
account of personhood are not our topic here. In thinking about love as a species
of the genus recognitive attitude, however, it makes all the difference. This is
assuming, as I have argued elsewhere (e.g. Ika¨heimo 2007), that all of the
recognitive attitudes are ‘personifying’ attitudes, or attitudes the having of which
involves, or is, taking the object as a person. One way to see the point of following
the strong formula that love as a recognitive attitude is a way of taking the other as a
person is this: in valuing things from the beloved’s perspective one relates to her in
light of similar practical person-making significances in light of which one (in non-
pathological cases) relates to oneself.
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One formulation of the point in question is ‘someone whose happiness or well-
being is unconditionally important’, which is to say important in the same way in
which a person’s own happiness or well-being is normally important for herself—
unconditioned by its importance for others.23 But since it is the flourishing or
perishing of what has value for a person that is the source of her happiness or
misery, another formulation for the same is something like ‘an irreducible
perspective of value’. The beloved’s perspective of possible happiness and misery
is a measure of value for the lover irreducible to anyone else’s perspective,
including the lover’s own thought of as separate from the beloved’s. In other
words, the beloved’s interests become the lover’s interests unconditionally,
without being conditioned by his own separate interests—just as a person’s own
interests are his interest unconditionally, without being conditioned by the separate
interests of any others.24 Having x in view in light of such practical, immediately
motivating significance—whether x is oneself or another—is, I suggest, one of the
most fundamental ways of having x in view as a person.25 It is one of the
‘personifying’ recognitive attitudes that are essential to the being of persons as
persons.
This also makes good sense of Aristotle’s famous and enigmatic thought that
a friend (philos) is ‘another self’ (Aristotle 2001a, 1166a31),26 as well as of
Hegel’s closely related idea that persons can find themselves in each other in
Liebe. That is, the other who loves me is ‘another me’ in the sense that the
perspective from which she values things and states of affairs includes my
perspective in a way unmediated by further evaluations, and this means that I can
really ‘find myself’, in the sense of my concerns, immediately affirmed by her
perspective of concern and thus ‘in her’. Both ideas find consummation in mutual
love, but even here the core phenomenon is love itself as the simple attitude of
unconditional concern for the other.
23 This is not to deny that a person can also care about his happiness because of its importance for others.
If you love me, my happiness is part of your happiness, and if I also love you, I do not want to make you
unhappy by making myself unhappy.
24 This does not rule out that I have separate interests that are in conflict with my beloved’s interests that
are also my interests because I love her. It only rules out that her interests are my interests merely because
of my separate interests. In other words, as Hegel always emphasized, the unity brought about by love
does not annul difference.
25 The recognitive attitude of respect is another fundamental way. What I am suggesting is that ‘person-
making’ significances in light of which an object of recognitive attitudes is revealed to their subject are
significances the applying of which to x is having particular kinds of motivations towards x. Call this
motivational internalism about taking someone as a person. I am trying to elaborate here on a theme that
Honneth mentions with regard to Dewey’s idea of the significance ‘man’ as having ‘a qualitative effect’
(2008, p. 40). In my view, Arto Laitinen’s critical reconstruction of ‘taking x as a person’ (Laitinen 2011)
misses this internalist point.
26 See also Vernon L. Provencal’s deeply Hegelian—even if Hegel is nowhere mentioned in the article—
discussion of the theme, developing the thesis that the idea of self-relation (through others) is fundamental
to Aristotle’s ethics (Provencal 2001). In light of Provencal’s reading Hegel and Aristotle are very close
to each other indeed.
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The Scope of Love
It is very widely thought—not only but also in recognition-theory—that love is
restricted to intimate relations such as those between family-members, erotic
‘lovers’, close friends and so on.27 Whether it is right to think so is a question
of importance for recognition-theory since it concerns the limits of application of
one of its major elements. But it is also of quite general importance to ask whether
it is really impossible to love people beyond a close circle of acquaintances.28 There
are three general ways in which one might be led to think that this is obviously
so—corresponding to the threefold distinction made above—each of which are in
different ways, so to say, out of focus.
One is identifying love with concrete interpersonal relationships of a kind that
are by their nature limited to small circles. For example, it is obvious that the
concrete ways in which one is related to one’s own family-members do not extend
beyond the family. I am not everyone’s son, brother, spouse, father or uncle, with all
the biographical, social, institutional and other particularities that being a son etc.
involves.
The second way is identifying love with attitudinal complexes of a kind that are
by their nature limited to small circles. The complex of attitudes and related
emotions and sensations that one has, say, with regard to one’s spouse or ‘lover’
tends to be rich, complicated and intense and there are obvious limits to having
anything comparable towards almost anyone else, not to mention people who one
does not know well or at all. This is even more obviously, or trivially, so if one
identifies love with complexes comprising of the relevant intertwining attitudes etc.
of both partners in a close relationship. Nothing of the sort of psychological
intimacy involved here is possible between people who know each other poorly or
not at all.
The third way is by confusing individual attitudes, emotions or sensations, or
having the wrong ones in mind. If one identifies love with, say, sexual desire for
a person, with longing for or enjoying life-companionship with him or her, or
with the various phenomena that go by the name ‘attachment’, it does not take
much to realize that each of them comes with obvious limits of reach. The same
goes for identifying love with emotions (say, particular forms of happiness or
27 Aristotle himself at one point says that one can only have eunoia (‘goodwill’), but not philia, with
regard to (a) people whom one does not know, as well as towards (b) people who do not know about one
(2001a, 1166b30–1166b32). But Aristotle does not explain why (a) is the case, and he contradicts himself
with (b), since he elsewhere talks about the philia of mothers towards their children whom they have
given away to be brought up elsewhere and who therefore do not know their mothers (2001a,
1159a28–1159a33).
28 There has recently been much interest in applying the Honnethian recognition-theoretical paradigm in
global issues. For articles prompting theorists to think about love as a form of recognition beyond the
intimate sphere of the family or other close relationships, see Heins (2008) and Thompson (forthcoming).
Thomas Lindemann (forthcoming) argues powerfully for the significance of ‘empathy’ between nations in
pacifying international relations and of ‘lack of empathy’ in encouraging armed conflicts. Honneth (2010)
has recently suggested that it is not feasible to distinguish between different types of recognition in the
explanation of the dynamics of international relations. I am more optimistic that the differentiated
conception of recognition, pioneered by Honneth himself, can be very illuminating also in global
applications of the paradigm.
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jealousy) that can only emerge when attitudes of the kind just mentioned are
present; or with some occurrent sensations of a kind one can only ever have with
regard to people one is very close to.
However, if one identifies love with what already Aristotle thought of as the focal
meaning of philia, what was arguably the core of Hegel’s discussion of Liebe,
what still today is at least one of the core senses of ‘love’, and what I suggest we
should understand by love as a recognitive attitude—the personifying attitude of
unconditional concern for someone’s happiness—then all of these ways of coming
to the conclusion that love cannot extend beyond circles of people psychologically
very close to each other are simply beside the point. They are not talking about the
right phenomenon.
But what about the right phenomenon then? Can one have love in the sense
of personifying unconditional concern for strangers? Let me take up one candidate
reason to think we cannot that looks especially challenging and that has been put
forth in recent work on recognition. In an article on the young Marx’s conception
of ‘true communist society’ Daniel Brudney comes to the conclusion that Marx’s
societal ideal of non-alienated production—as producing for others out of love for
them—is, literally speaking, conceptually incoherent beyond a social context in
which it is possible for producers to personally know the consumers. Why? Because
on Brudney’s view love as a concern for well-being requires individuated objects,
and unknown consumers remain ‘altogether unindividuated’ (Brudney 2010, p. 160)
for the producer. According to Brudney, the same objection applies generally to the
idea of loving people en masse—say ‘billions of unknown, distant others’ (Brudney
2010, p. 161). Brudney does not, however, see this necessarily as a serious problem
for what Marx was after, nor for the idea of ethical relations with distant, unknown
others generally, since all that is needed for reclaiming these is replacing the
concept of love with the concept of ‘concern’. For concern, as Brudney understands
it, does not require individuated objects (Brudney 2010, p. 161).
I see a potential problem here. This stems from the possibility that in being
concerned about the well-being of people in a way which is not individuating one is
being concerned about them in a way which is also not personifying. What is it after
all that distinguishes what Brudney means by ‘concern’ for the well-being of
unknown other people from the non-personifying kinds of concern one could
normally have for the well-being of, say, the rain-forests of Sumatra? If nothing,
then I believe Brudney’s suggestion fails to reclaim what the young Marx was after.
Marx namely thought it essential that in a communist society producers and
consumers ‘relate to each other as humans’ (Brudney 2010, p. 166; Marx 1975,
p. 447)29—which I believe is best reconstructed as relating to each other in terms of
attitude–complexes that involve taking each other as persons. As Brudney observes,
love is indeed fundamental in such complexes for the young Marx, and this suggests
that he may be committed to the thought that love is at least necessarily
accompanied by, if not simply is a form of, personification of its objects.
29 I have replaced ‘men’ with ‘humans’ to translate the original ‘Menschen’. What Marx means by a
‘human relation’ is on my reconstruction a concrete relationship in which recognitive, and thus
personifying attitudes have an adequate role.
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But not only is a non-personifying concern for people arguably an inadequate
reconstruction of what the young Marx was after, as the only or predominating
attitude towards people it is also commonsensically insulting, often humiliating, and
ethically deeply problematic. For sure, in being in serious need of help from others
one might prefer being the object of their non-personifying concern to not being an
object of their concern at all—say, being saved from starvation by benefactors
whose only motive is to profit from the ones whom they decide to raise above
starvation as cheap labour. Similarly, if the alternative is unappealing enough, one
might prefer being saved by benefactors who see oneself, or the group in which one
belongs, as an object with ‘intrinsic value’—just as someone may (at least claim
to) see, say, the Sumatran rainforests, the biosphere, or particularly beautiful,
interesting or rare pieces of art, as valuable, not (at least merely) for the sake of
something else but ‘intrinsically’, and thus as something that should be salvaged
from destruction or dereliction.30
Yet, in being valued instrumentally or ‘intrinsically,’ one is not thereby an object
of personifying, unconditional concern for happiness or subjective well-being, nor is
one thereby seen in light of any other person-making significance either. Neither
of these attitudes is as such a personifying attitude and neither of them necessarily
even implies the presence of personifying attitudes—or of recognition—that is.31
And to the extent that one is the object of attitude-complexes that lack the
personifying attitudes of recognition, one is, I take it, being reified or thingified.32
Why is this important? One of the many reasons is the following: assuming that
the idea of solidarity—in any ethically substantial sense—implies personifying, or
non-reifying concern for the happiness or well-being of the relevant others, the
impossibility of having such an attitude towards unknown others means that the
idea of solidarity between people who are not intimately connected is stillborn.
Solidarity on the level of large modern societies is a contradiction in terms, the idea
of global solidarity even more so—not to mention the idea of solidarity for future
generations. All nothing but sentimental nonsense. Are they, really? Is it really the
case that the best that people personally unknown to each other can expect from
each other in terms of concern is to be cared about either instrumentally, or then in
some other sort of non-personifying, reifying way?
I do not think so, and considering the implications to the idea of solidarity I doubt
that most ethically serious people are willing to think so either. Assuming that they
are right, the philosophical task is to show how personifying, unconditional
concern—love that is—for distant or unknown others is possible. There is no space
to develop the theme at any length here, but let me make a short comment about one
possible direction of further inquiry. What may be the decisive issue is the role of
imagination in our concrete relationships to others who are unknown to us, or who
30 Think of, for example, aestheticizing versions along the lines of ‘they are such strange and beautiful
people … strange and beautiful things are intrinsically valuable … therefore they should be conserved’.
There is a familiar form of cultural fetishism that has undertones of this sort of aesthetist reification of
people of other cultures.
31 Esteem, or as I prefer to call it ‘contributional valuing’, is a more complicated matter. See Ika¨heimo
and Laitinen (2010).
32 This should go to show that ignoring this distinction, as Frankfurt seems to do, is not a trivial matter.
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we know poorly.33 What we are not personally acquainted with, we tend to fill in
with products of our imagination, and these are (ideally) placeholders for what we
could, or may, learn in real encounter.34 As it is of decisive significance for our
relations to others in real interpersonal encounters whether, or to what extent, we see
the others in light of person-making significance (or they us), it is also of decisive
significance for imagining others whether, or to what extent, one imagines or
construes them in light of person-making significance.35
To the extent that our actions affect the lives of others unknown to us personally,
a question of major practical, political and ethical importance is how we imagine
those others, or how we construe the imaginary others that in our minds hold
their place. Even if it is impossible to individuate and thus personify unknown
others, individuating and personifying imaginary others is not—and this may be the
decisive phenomenon. Even imagining a large group of persons personally unknown
to oneself as a group of persons must, it seems, involve imagining (at least some
representative) individuals in light of person-making significances. Raimond Gaita
gives a good example of imagining others without enough of this: a western woman
watches a television documentary about Vietnamese mothers whose children were
killed in bombing raids, and comments ‘But it’s different for them, they can simply
have more’ (Gaita 1999, pp. 57–60). What I am thus suggesting is that the key
notion for rationally reconstructing the idea of ethical relations of solidarity towards
distant or unknown others, and thereby salvaging it from all too easy refutation or
cynic ridicule, may not be that of loving strictly speaking, but of imagining lovingly.
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